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Abstract 
Germany is one of few countries in which the monetary compensation for inventors is not 
only determined by negotiations between employer and employee-inventor, but also by 
relatively precise legal provisions. In this paper, we describe the characteristics of the German 
Employees’ Inventions Act (GEIA) and discuss which incentives it creates. We rely on 
responses from a recent survey of 3,350 German inventors to test hypotheses regarding this 
institution. We conclude from our data that the law creates substantial monetary rewards for 
productive inventors. The qualitative responses from our survey confirm this view, but also 
point to a number of dysfunctional effects. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2001, the EU15 countries invested a total of € 175.5 billion in research and development 
activities. Approximately two thirds of this amount were R&D expenditures made by business 
enterprises, the remainder shared by publicly financed research institutions and academia. 
Almost 70 percent of these investments are expenditures for R&D personnel. Yet, it is 
surprising how little attention is given to the transformational process behind these numbers. 
Clearly, the development of ideas and new concepts is financed by the funds just summarized. 
But the actual work is done by inventors, either in corporate labs, in publicly financed 
research institutions or in academic research, and their motivation and incentives should 
matter greatly for Europe’s chances of becoming more successful in global technology 
markets. 
While the innovation literature in the early 50s and 60s contributed a large number of insights 
into invention processes1, much of the subsequent work in this field turned away from the 
individual inventors to consider the overall design of processes and organization. The 
underlying paper does not follow this trend, but seeks to return to a topic that is probably a 
highly neglected one in contemporary innovation studies – the motivation and performance of 
individual inventors. Using a novel dataset with extensive information on the context of 
invention processes, the value of inventions, and the biography and mobility of inventors, we 
describe a rather unique institutional setting in which the compensation of inventors is 
determined by law. The backdrop of our study is the German Employees’ Inventions Act 
(GEIA), once hailed as progress towards giving inventors a fair share of the benefits that they 
produce in creative work, and nowadays criticized as heavy-handed government intervention 
in processes public administrators should better not meddle in. 
There are few processes that go unregulated in Germany. The compensation for employee-
inventors is one of the processes which many countries have left to be negotiated between the 
parties involved, the inventors and the corporations. Only very few countries have embedded 
rules and provisions in the civil code or in legal provisions. There has been a long-standing 
debate in Germany (but also in other countries) whether such regulation really creates proper 
incentives for ingenuity and inventions. Some authors have pointed out that the regulation 
may actually be counterproductive in that it induces strategic behavior among inventors and 
firms which may be harmful to innovation incentives. 
Since much of the potential behavior cannot be observed easily, we use inventor responses 
from a large-scale survey to explore some of these issues. We find that inventor compensation 
in Germany allocates some returns to inventors – in a few cases exceeding gross salaries by a 
factor of two and more. But in most cases, the compensation appears quite moderate from the 
inventor’s perspective. In our survey data, we measure the inventor’s compensation as the 
compensation received for a particular patent (or all patents to which the inventor contributed) 
divided by the gross salary without inventor compensation. The extent to which inventors 
profit from their inventions can be shown to depend most strongly on the invention’s value 
and quality. Second, the number of inventors has a very plausible impact which appears to be 
largely in accordance with the legal provisions. Variables associated with the inventor’s rank 
in the organization also impact significantly on the compensation share variable, which is 
again consistent with the legal provisions. While inventor productivity (the average annual 
                                                 
1
  Consider for example the work in Ritti (1971) and Allen (1977). 
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number of inventions made over the inventor’s active career) contributes positively to patent 
value, it has a negative coefficient in our compensation regressions. Similarly, educational 
attainment is negatively associated with the compensation share variable. These results 
presumably reflect the legal rule that individuals higher up in the organization will profit less 
from a service invention – simply since contributing to such inventions is part of their normal 
job for which they are compensated by relatively high salaries. Taken these and other results 
together, it appears that the mechanism is basically meritocratic in nature, and that it follows 
the legal provisions quite closely. 
Our survey responses also yield qualitative insights into the functioning of the compensation 
schemes. Most inventors (59.5 percent) view the legal regulation positively, largely because 
of its financial effect in their favor. Others emphasize the fact that the risk and costs of 
patenting are born by the employer. Among the 28.3 percent who view the compensation 
rules largely negative, two opinions are dominant – that the compensation is not large enough, 
and that the compensation scheme lacks transparency. A criticism frequently encountered in 
the literature concerns the tendency that superiors appear among the inventors although they 
have not contributed to the invention. Inventors may accommodate such requests (or even 
suggest an inclusion of other decision-makers) in order to maximize the chance of having an 
invention being protected by patents. We do not find much evidence of such strategic 
behavior – only 1.8 percent of the respondents mention it. These results support a cautious 
positive assessment of the German Employees’ Inventions Act, but we cannot compare the 
compensation rules to a setting in which bonuses would be negotiated bilaterally between 
employer and employee-inventor. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the history and 
provisions of the German Employees’ Inventions Act. We also summarize the results from 
previous studies that have analyzed this nexus. In section 3, we discuss our research questions 
in more detail and specify the hypotheses to be tested later. Section 4 presents the data and 
discusses the key variables that we have devised for the multivariate analysis. In section 5, we 
present some descriptive evidence bearing on our main question, while the multivariate results 
are presented in section 6. The final section provides a brief discussion of our results and 
concludes. 
 
2 Invention Processes and the German Employees’ Inventions Act 
2.1 Salient Features of Invention Processes 
To assess the efficacy of institutionalized incentives for inventors, it is helpful to consider the 
salient features of invention processes first. We do not attempt to draw a real-life picture of 
such processes here, but a basic understanding of their features is important to understand the 
basic incentive problems. We make three observations on inventions and patents: first, 
productivity among inventors appears to be very heterogeneous in the sense that few inventors 
produce the lion’s share of inventions within an R&D department; second, the value of 
individual patent rights follows a highly skew distribution which can be approximated quite 
well using a log-normal distribution function; third, inventions are often made by or within 
teams. Thus, the dynamics of R&D teams is highly relevant for our study. We discuss these 
points in turn. 
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The productivity of inventors is quite heterogeneously distributed. An early study of this issue 
was undertaken by Lotka (1926). Lotka analyzed the publication output of scientists. His 
research resulted in the following equation, often referred to as Lotka’s Law - the number of 
scientists producing exactly n papers is proportional to 1/n2. Hence, when 100 scientists 
publish exactly one paper per time period, it would be a share of 1/22, i.e. 25 who would 
produce two papers in that time period, about 11 (1/32) with three publications, and so on. 
One may argue that such differences in productivity may merely be a function of experience 
(and age). Allison/Steward (1974) undertook a study to distinguish between time-invariant 
effects associated with the individual inventor, and experience effects due to the cumulative 
advantage of scientists. Cumulative advantage means that scientists become more productive 
during their professional life. As a measure of productivity, the authors used the number of 
citations received by scientific articles of US scientists in university departments. Results 
showed that both, pre-existing differences and cumulative advantage affect differences in 
scientists’ productivity. Note that in this study, output is measured using the quantity of 
output, not its quality. But as it turns out, the relatively good performance in terms of 
publication numbers is not achieved by trading quantity off against quality. Ernst et al. (2000) 
conducted a survey on inventors of 43 German firms and show that highly productive 
inventors are frequently responsible for the most valuable patents. Narin/Breitzman (1995) 
extended Lotka’s findings on patented inventions in the semiconductor industry. As a result, 
they find that output is even more concentrated than Lotka’s Law suggests. 
A multitude of attempts have been made to measure patent value using value indicators drawn 
from patent documents available in patent databases of national or regional patent offices. 
Indicators used are e.g., the number of citations received (Trajtenberg 1990, Harhoff et al. 
1999, Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999), the number of claims (Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999 and 
2001), the incidence of an opposition or litigation (Lanjouw/Schankerman 1999, 
Harhoff/Reitzig 2001, Harhoff/Hall 2003), or patent renewal data (Pakes 1986, 
Schankerman/Pakes 1986, Lanjouw et al. 1998). Results of most of these approaches have 
one element in common: they provide evidence for a highly skewed distribution of patent 
value (i.e., Harhoff et al. 1999, Scherer et al. 2000). Scherer et al. (2000) show that the top 
decile of German patents in 1977 accounted for 88 percent of the total value. 
Giummo (2003) analyzes the time profile of returns to patented inventions, as well as its 
cumulative value. In his analysis, information on patent value was gained from compensation 
records of German inventors of six major German companies (the variable we are analyzing 
later on). Calculation of the amount of compensation requires valuation of the surveyed 
invention. Therefore, compensation records are often considered a good proxy for patent 
value (up to a factor of proportionality). Building on this assumption, Giummo confirms 
previous findings concerning the skewness of the distribution of patent value. 
The third characteristic of modern invention processes is team production. In our data, only 
24 percent of the inventions covered by our survey were made by individual employee-
inventors. Inventor teams consist on average of 2.5 inventors. Incentive systems need to take 
this characteristic into account by coming up with a sharing rule for inventor compensation. 
While the negotiations between co-inventors can be acrimonious, even more complex cases 
arise in the context of sequential inventions. Suppose that team A has made a basic invention 
upon which the inventions of several other inventor teams are based. If subsequent inventions 
replace the original one in the marketplace, the earlier inventors may see their compensation 
erode because too little emphasis is given to the pioneering nature of their contribution. In our 
 5 
survey responses, some of these conflicts will turn out to be important. 
 
2.2 Institutionalized Compensation Schemes in Various Countries 
In Germany, the rights and liabilities within an employer–employee-inventor relationship are 
governed by a specific legal institution. Comparable legal regulations only exist in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. We briefly consider a few features of these systems before 
turning to the German institutions. 
The Swedish Employees' Invention Act is of dispositive nature, i.e., the legal provisions may 
be amended by the employer or the employee as long as the employee’s basic right to 
compensation is not affected. Basically, the Swedish Employees' Invention Act distinguishes 
between two types of employee inventions: the work-related invention and the invention 
arising outside the context of employment. The rights on work-related inventions are fully 
transferred to the employer. For the second type, the rights to the invention remain with the 
employee. The employee may apply for a patent before reporting the invention to the 
employer, however, she must offer the employer the right to use the invention (Rebel 1993). 
The Danish Employees' Invention Act is similar to the Swedish law. The right to the invention 
remains with the employee-inventor. The inventor is obliged to report all inventions to the 
employer. For inventions which were made in the course of the employee's normal work the 
employer can claim the right to the invention. The claiming of the right has to be declared no 
later than four months from receipt of the invention report. Disagreements are brought before 
a board of arbitration. The inventor’s claim to a reasonable compensation is deemed to be 
satisfied with his regular salary (Rebel 1993). 
In the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Japan, regulations 
concerning employee-invention are part of the respective national patent laws. According to 
Section 39 (1) of the English Patents Act2 inventions “made in the course of the normal duties 
of the employee” or made in the course of “duties falling outside his normal duties, but 
specifically assigned to him” belong to the employer. The remaining inventions belong to the 
inventor himself. Compensation is to be paid only if the invention is of outstanding benefit to 
the employer (Section 40 (1) English Patents Act). Disputes concerning the compensation are 
submitted to court or are decided by the comptroller within the firm (Section 41 English 
Patents Act).3  
The French Patent Law also assigns inventions which are made in fulfillment of an 
employment contract to the employer. The employee-inventor may come into possession of 
additional compensation (compensation beyond normal salary) if a claim to compensation is 
regulated by plant agreement (i.e., between employer and works council) or by contractual 
agreements between employer and inventor. Disputes concerning compensation have to be 
resolved by an arbitration commission or in court (Reitzle et al. 2000). 
The Italian legal regulations differ from the French ones with respect to inventor 
                                                 
2
 See http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/legal/consolidation.pdf for the English Patents Act of 1977 (access on 
August 18, 2005). 
3
  See Littler/Pearson (1979) and Orkin (1984) for a more detailed description of compensation of employee-
inventors in the UK. 
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compensation. If no special arrangements have been made, the inventor is entitled to a 
reasonable compensation, depending on the economic value of the invention. The amount 
payable to the inventor decreases with the degree of involvement of the employer in the 
creation of the invention (Rebel 1993). 
In Austria, employees explicitly referred to as “inventors” are excluded from receiving a 
compensation or only receive a limited payment. Inventors are considered to be sufficiently 
compensated for inventive efforts with their regular monthly salary. However, special 
agreements leading to some compensation for the inventors are allowed. The amount of 
remuneration depends on the economic value of the invention (Rebel 1993). 
Almost the same regulations are applied in the Netherlands. An inventor obtains an additional 
compensation if and only if she has not already been sufficiently remunerated by her regular 
salary. The amount of compensation is again derived from the economic value of the 
invention which is determined by the employer (Rebel 1993).  
The Japanese Patent Act basically assigns the right to the invention to the employee (§ 35 
Japanese Patent Act). The employer receives the right to a non-exclusive license and is not 
obligated to pay compensation. Assignment of an employee-invention to the employer may be 
regulated in advance by contract or employment negotiations. In this case, the right to the 
invention is passed to the employer or the employer receives an exclusive license. The 
employee is then entitled to receive a reasonable remuneration on the part of the employer 
(Yano 1992).4 
In Switzerland and Liechtenstein employee-inventions are subject to civil law. According to 
Art 332 Obligation Law (Obligationenrecht), patentable and not patentable inventions made 
during the employee's normal work duties are to be reported to the employer. Rights to the 
invention are assigned to the employer. Payment of compensation is compulsory. The amount 
of payment depends on the economic value of the service invention, the duties and position of 
the employee in the firm, the contribution made by the employer and by third parties, and 
finally on the extent internal equipment has been used for making the invention. Disputes 
have to be solved by labor court (Rebel 1993). 
In the United States5 and in Canada, there exist no special legal provisions pertaining to 
inventor compensation. Basically, the inventor principle is applied which means that the 
invention belongs to the inventor. Therefore, patents are always applied for in the inventor's 
name, and are then assigned to the employer. Conditions concerning an assignment of the 
invention to the employer are to be regulated by contractual agreements. Typical employment 
contracts in the US therefore specify the following obligations for employee-inventors: first, 
the employee-inventor has to notify the employer of each invention made. Second, the 
employee-inventor has to keep secret any invention or company related information, and 
finally, the inventor has to confer all rights to the invention to the employer during the 
employer-employee relationship. The employee-inventor in return has no legal claim to 
                                                 
4
  In a recent case, the inventor of blue laser diode technology, Shuji Nakamura, was awarded inventor 
compensation at the amount of US$ 188.7 million on January 30th 2004. See  
http://www.compoundsemi.com/documents/articles/news/3693.html (access on July 29, 2005). 
5
  See Merges (1991) for the description of the U.S. regulations concerning service inventions. Kline (1992) and 
Savitsky (1991) also provide insights into the compenation practices in the US.  
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compensation. Compensation may also be determined in the employment contract. In cases 
where no contractual agreements exist between the employer and the employee-inventors and 
where the employer was instrumental in making the invention (e.g., by providing the inventor 
with the necessary tools, materials, or financial resources), the employer receives a “shop 
right”. Due to this shop right, the employer obtains a non-exclusive license. In exchange, the 
employer pays a license-fee of 1 US$ representing a symbolic inventor compensation 
(Leptien 1996, 98; Rebel 1993). 
 
2.3 Historical Aspects of the German Employees’ Inventions Act 
While regional patent systems existed in German states already in the 18th century, the first 
federal German Patent Law came into force in 1877. Given the limited number of employee-
inventors at the end of the 19th century, there was little need for specific legal regulation 
concerning employee-inventors. But the increase in the number of employee-inventors at the 
beginning of the 20th century led to an increasing demand for legislation (Kurz 1997, 1). A 
first cooperative agreement between employers and employees in the chemical industry was 
negotiated during the First World War. The Chemists’ Collective Bargaining Agreement6 
(Chemikertarifvertrag) for academically trained employees was passed in 1920. As of 1934, 
considerable efforts were made to replace collective labor agreements (Tarifverträge) by a 
law regulating the cooperation between employer and employee-inventor. Finally, in 1939 the 
parties involved came to a compromise. But the draft law was rejected by the government due 
to its complexity. In 1942, as the Second World War turned out to become an economic war, 
the minister of armament single-handedly enforced a legal regulation, the Provision on the 
Handling of Inventions of Subordinates (Verordnung über die Behandlung von Erfindungen 
von Gefolgschaftsmitgliedern)7. The regulation already contained a number of provisions that 
were converted into today’s Act on Employees’ Inventions without substantial modifications. 
The Provision on the Handling of Inventions of Subordinates (PHIS), for instance, included 
the obligation of the subordinate to report the invention (§3 PHIS), the obligation to keep the 
invention secret (§6 (3) PHIS), the claiming right of the employer within 6 months after 
receiving the report of an invention (§4 PHIS), and the claim of the subordinate to reasonable 
remuneration. Mode and amount of the remuneration had to be negotiated between employer 
and subordinate (§5 PHIS) (Kurz 1997, 91ff). On March 20, 1943, the Remuneration 
Guidelines for Subordinates’ Inventions (Richtlinien für die Vergütung von Gefolgschafts-
erfindungen) were added to the provisions. The guidelines provided instructions to estimate 
the degree of the inventive effort, necessary to calculate the amount of remuneration. The 
degree of inventive effort depended on (1) the conceptual formulation of the problem ,i.e., the 
degree of the subordinate’s own initiative, (2) the solution of the problem, and (3) the position 
of the subordinate within the firm (Kurz, 1977, 103). 
In the aftermath of the war, employers and unions were keen to reestablish the German patent 
system as soon as possible. The draft law, becoming the first government bill 
(Regierungsentwurf) for an Act on Employees’ Inventions in 1952, was prepared by the 
Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesjustizministerium) and also by the German Association for 
Intellectual Property Rights and Copyright Protection (Deutsche Vereinigung für 
                                                 
6
  Reichstarifvertrag für die akademisch gebildeten Angestellten der chemischen Industrie as of April 27, 1920. 
7
  See Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1943, p. 466. 
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gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht). The government bill proposed the 
establishment of a board of arbitration at the German Patent Office. Due to a lengthy 
discussion about amendments, the German Bundestag could not pass the draft law during the 
legislative period between 1949 and 1953. Thus the Federal Ministry of Justice worked on a 
new proposal. In 1955, the second government bill was brought forward. The second proposal 
excluded technical improvement proposals8, release under reserve of a use (Freigabe unter 
Benutzungsvorbehalt) was replaced by restricted claiming of inventions, and the provisions on 
inventions of university professors and scientific assistants9 were added. By means of this 
proposal passing of the law became possible. 
In 1957 the German Employees’ Inventions Act became effective. The need for this 
legislation arose because of a conflict between the German Employment Law and the Patent 
Law. According to the German Employment Law, the results of the work of an employee 
belong to the employer, whereas the Patent Law assigns the property of an invention to the 
inventor himself. The Employees’ Inventions Act produced a balance between employer and 
employee. Whenever the rights to the patent are transferred to the employer, the employer 
must in return pay the employee-inventor a reasonable compensation. Moreover, the law was 
supposed to strengthen incentives for inventors in corporations (Leptien 1996, 83). 
 
2.4 Regulations of the German Employees’ Inventions Act as of 1957 
In its current form, the German Employees’ Inventions Act applies to all patentable 
inventions (patented or not) or inventions which are eligible for a utility model as well as to 
any other technical improvement proposals made by employees (§§2, 3 ArbNErfG10). The 
Act applies to inventions made by inventors in organizations which are governed under 
German law or in German subsidiaries of international organizations. It provides a set of rules 
concerning rights and liabilities of both the employer and the employee. 
The Act distinguishes between service inventions and free inventions. Service inventions are 
inventions which either result from the obligatory activity of the employee in the company or 
“(…) are substantially based on experience or activities of the company” (§4 ArbNErfG). 
Other inventions, for instance, inventions made by employees during their leisure time or by 
self-employed inventors, are free inventions. According to §5 ArbNErfG the employee is 
obligated to report a service invention to the employer immediately.11 Within the period of 
                                                 
8
 The first government bill assigned the monopoly principle (Monopolprinzip) to inventions and the 
supplementary benefit principle (Sonderleistungsprinzip) to technical improvement proposals. According to 
the monopoly principle, the inventor was granted a compensation for providing his employer with a monopoly 
(the right from the patented invention). According to the supplementary benefit principle, the right to a 
compensation arises from an effort not bounded by contract. Since the new proposal aimed at aligning the law 
with the monopoly principle, technical improvement proposals were excluded from the second government 
bill (Kurz 1997, 232). 
9
  According to §42 ArnErfG, containing the handling of university inventions, inventions of professors, 
lecturers and scientific assistants were free inventions. Meanwhile, §42 ArbNErfG, and in particular the so-
called professorial privilege, has been revoked. On February 7, 2002, the modified §42 ArbNErfG became 
effective, which treats university inventions as inventor-employee inventions and therefore, as service 
inventions. 
10
 Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz (ArbNErfG) 
11
 Free inventions also have to be reported without delay. In case the employer does not contradict that the 
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four months from the receipt of the report of the invention, the employer can claim the 
invention on a restricted or unrestricted basis (§6 ArbNErfG). If the employer does not claim 
the invention the legal title to the invention is released to the inventor. In case of an 
unrestricted claim to the invention, all rights to the invention are transferred to the employer, 
and the employer is obliged to file a national patent application for the invention. A restricted 
claim provides the employer with a non-exclusive right to use the invention, which implies 
that the employer is not allowed to grant licenses on the patented invention (Reitzle et al. 
2000). Restricted claims turn out to be quite infrequent – in our data, only 2.6 percent of all 
patents are claimed by the employer on a restricted basis. In the case of a restricted claim, the 
employer has no obligation to file a German patent application. An inventor, who wants his 
invention to be protected by a patent, has to file the application in his own name. 
Once the invention is claimed, either in restricted or unrestricted form, the employer has the 
obligation to reasonably compensate the inventor. The inventor’s right to remuneration arises 
as soon as the employer has claimed the right to the service invention (unrestricted claiming 
of right) or as soon as the employer has claimed the right to the invention and uses it 
(restricted claiming of right). Guidelines for the Remuneration of Employees’ Inventions in 
Private Employment12 were first issued by the Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs 
(Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung) in 1959. These guidelines are based upon the 
Remuneration Guidelines for Subordinates’ Inventions from March 20, 1943. They regulate in 
some detail how the compensation is determined. The compensation is supposed to be 
proportional to the value of the invention. According to Section 1 of the guidelines, three 
different methods exist for calculating the value of the invention:  
 
• by using a licensing analogy, i.e., by determining the license fee that would have to be 
paid for the use of a comparable invention owned by a third party, 
• by calculating the benefits from the invention accruing to the employer, i.e., the 
difference between costs and revenues resulting from the use of the invention, or  
• by estimation of the value of the invention, i.e., by determining the price which would 
have had to be paid by the company to buy the invention from a free inventor. 
 
The estimation of the value of the invention provides the basis for the calculation of the 
compensation payable to the inventor. In a second step, the share of value accruing to the 
inventor(s) is determined. According to §9 (2) ArbNErfG, the proportion attributable to the 
inventor(s) depends:  
• on the economic exploitability of the service invention, i.e., the value of the invention, 
which is determined according to the three above described methods, 
                                                                                                                                                        
invention is free, it is at the employee’s disposal (§§ 18, 19 ArbNErfG). 
12
 See Bundesanzeiger No. 156 of 18.08.1959, Annex. The Guidelines were amended by Sept. 1, 1983, see 
Bundesanzeiger 1983, p. 9994. The guidelines are not legally binding provisions. They only provide an 
informative basis for calculating the inventors’ compensation. However, the Board of Arbitration at the 
German Patent and Trademark Office as well as the courts check the appropriateness of compensation by 
means of these guidelines (Leptien 1996, 86). 
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• on the duties and position of the employee in the company, i.e., the share of the 
inventor in the creation of the service invention decreases the more it is expected of 
him by reason of his position and by the amount of salary paid to him at the time of 
the report of the invention, and also  
• on the degree of involvement of the company in the creation of the service invention, 
i.e., the share of the inventor in the creation of the service invention increases the 
greater his own initiative in recognizing the problem, and the smaller the company’s 
support with technical assistance. 
If more than one employee-inventor is responsible for a service invention, the relative 
contributions of the inventors have to be specified. §12 (2) ArbNErfG constitutes that the 
compensation must be determined for each inventor separately. Each inventor has to be 
informed about the total amount of remuneration and the share received by the other co-
inventors. 
Disputes arising between employees and employer regarding the inventors’ compensation can 
be brought before the Board of Arbitration at the German Patent and Trademark Office in 
Munich or Berlin (§§28-36 ArbNErfG). The Arbitration Board issues a proposal for a 
settlement. This proposal is binding for both parties unless a written opposition is filed within 
one month. Should an appeal be filed against the proposal, the proceedings before the 
Arbitration Board are deemed to have been unsuccessful and the filing of an action with the 
court having jurisdiction (the respective district court) is possible. On average, fewer than 100 
disputes per year are negotiated before the Arbitration Board (GPTO 2003). Compared to the 
annual number of patent applications to which the German Employees’ Inventions Act 
applies13, this number is quite small. 
 
2.5 The Impact of the German Employees’ Inventions Act 
Since its inception in 1957, the German Employees’ Inventions Act has been subject to many 
controversial discussions. Within the last 20 years, a number of economic and legal studies 
have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the law and of the associated institutions. 
The Act aimed at creating a social balance between employer and employee, as well as 
providing incentives for inventive activities. Several theoretical and empirical analyses have 
examined to what extent this original objective of the Employees’ Invention Act has been 
attained. In the following section, we summarize some results from this literature. 
We first address literature, providing potential advantages of the German law. According to 
Merges (1999), the Employees’ Invention Act enhances the degree of legal certainty for 
employee-inventors. Due to the law, inventors are entitled to receive compensation in 
exchange for the assignment of the rights to the invention. A transfer of rights to the employer 
is economically plausible, since the employer may have made specific investments in 
complementary assets to exploit the employee’s invention. To ensure employment, firms have 
to balance risks by holding a patent portfolio. Successful inventions can compensate for losses 
(Merges 1999). Apart from spreading the risk, employee-inventors would not be able to afford 
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 In 2002 e.g., the German Patent and Trademark Office (GPTO) received 51,513 patent applications from 
enterprises which are governed by German law and thus by the inventor compensation scheme (GPTO 2003). 
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costs associated with patent applications.  
The following two empirical analyses highlight the importance of remuneration for inventive 
activity: Already in 1931, Rossman asked 710 inventors about their motives and incentives 
which cause them to invent. The most important motives of inventing turned out to be “love 
of inventing”, “desire to improve”, and “financial gain” (Rossman 1931, 523f). The relevance 
of monetary incentives, in particular inventor compensation, was also confirmed by Staudt et 
al. (1990) who conducted a survey of 522 employee-inventors. Respondents were drawn by 
random sampling from a list of all German patents published in 1987 and held by German 
applicants. Results show that more than 70 percent of the inventors rank inventor 
compensation as important. Less important are advancement, trainings, or flexible working 
hours (Staudt et al. 1990).  
Results from the above described analyses indicate that inventors basically regard the legal 
regulations as motivating for inventive activity. But the literature also points to some 
dysfunctional effects that the Employees’ Invention Act may have. For example, delayed 
payments are generally thought to provide relatively weak incentives for inventive effort. A 
study of 10 major inventions conducted by Globe at el. (1973) shows that inventions are 
brought to market several years after the date of patent application. The results of this study 
show that the shortest time lag from invention to commercialization and therefore to payment 
of the remuneration amounts to 6 years. Brockhoff (1997) argues that large firms frequently 
are organized in terms of profit centers and therefore are keen to delay payment. Additionally, 
exorbitant administration efforts impede annual payment. As a rule, compensation is paid in 
two- or three-year intervals (Brockhoff 1997). 
Another frequently discussed issue concerns the actual calculation of the remuneration. First 
of all, the German Employees’ Inventions Act does not provide detailed provisions 
concerning the calculation of the compensation. Inventors, therefore, complain about the 
strong influence that employers may have on how remuneration is determined. Furthermore, 
in many cases there is a choice among potential reference quantities (e.g., sales or production 
quantity) which can influence the amount of compensation considerably (Gaul 1988). In this 
context, Kersten (1996) criticizes that compensation is calculated as proportion of overall 
turnovers achieved with a product. Therefore, radical innovations (which initially generate 
very low levels of revenues, but a large relative increase in revenues) are disadvantaged in 
comparison to incremental innovations or modifications of existing technology. To counteract 
such effects, Kersten proposes to limit compensation to the actual increase in sales due to the 
invention. 
Additionally, the allocation of remuneration between co-inventors may lead to a reduction of 
employee inventors’ motivation. Each inventor is entitled to be informed on the total amount 
of remuneration and the shares that each co-inventor receives. However, the attribution of 
performance is difficult and often leads to controversies. Furthermore, an increase in the 
number of co-inventors reduces compensation for every single inventor. The motivation 
within a research team may suffer from such disputes (Staudt et al. 1992, Heimbach 1992). 
Moreover, the profitability of new products is also impacted by efforts made by employees 
other than inventors. Manly (1978) criticizes that legal regulations “ (...) single out one cog in 
the innovative wheel – the inventor”. The author especially argues that today's R&D 
processes are characterized by cooperation within interdisciplinary teams of specialists from 
different functions within the firm. The German Employees' Invention Act in contrast is only 
applicable for employee-inventors. 
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Moreover, Staudt et al. (1992) find that 27.9 percent of the questioned inventors complain 
about superiors being mentioned in invention reports because of their hierarchical position, 
but not due to their contribution to the invention. The phenomenon of executives being 
included as co-inventors without having made a contribution to the invention is also reported 
by Brockhoff (1997) and Schmeisser (1986). 
Delay of payment, intransparent calculation of remuneration and unfair allocation of 
remuneration between co-inventors are only three examples of causes for disputes between 
employer and employee-inventor. According to §28 ArbNErfG, the Board of Arbitration may 
be called upon in case of a dispute. However, both Giummo (2003) and Manly (1978) find 
that the number of conflicts brought before the Arbitration Board at the German Patent and 
Trademark Office is relatively small when compared to the overall number of patents for 
which such a conflict could in principle arise.14 But they differ in their interpretation of this 
indicator. Manly (1976) interprets the limited amount of disputes as a sign of an effective 
operation of legal regulations in Germany. Conversely, Giummo (2003) argues that inventor 
employees are unlikely to jeopardize their careers by initiating a legal conflict with their 
employer. In his interpretation, the low number of conflicts is not informative about the actual 
effectiveness of the legal provisions governing inventor compensation. 
Another possible interpretation may be that inventors are not sufficiently informed about the 
legal provisions of the German Employees’ Inventions Act. Leptien (1996) surveyed 116 
inventors of German firms active in the electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and 
chemical industries. One of the major findings is that 13 percent of the inventors are 
inadequately informed about the regulations of the Employees’ Invention Act. Staudt et al. 
(1992) confirm that employee-inventors have only partial knowledge of their rights.  
Given the controversy surrounding inventor compensation in general and the German 
institutions in particular, it is not surprising that some observers have called for the abolition 
of the law. For example, Brockhoff (1997) proposes to replace the collective legal regulation 
with an individual incentive system for employee-inventors, where compensation is a result of 
negotiations between inventor and employee. 
 
3 Research questions and hypotheses 
While a number of studies have looked at particular features of the German Employees’ 
Inventions Act, little representative large-sample evidence has been produced. The most 
reliable information on the amounts paid out to inventors comes from Giummo’s (2003) 
study. But his figures are not representative, since they reflect inventor compensation in a few 
large corporations. The questions that we address in this study are the following: 
 
                                                 
14
 In 2002 the patent stock of the GPTO amounted to 376,744 patents. This number includes patents granted by 
the EPO with effect in Germany. According to the GPTO annual report, more than 80% of the applications 
filed with the GPTO are attributable to German firms. Therefore, patents coming under the German 
Employees' Invention Act at least amount to 300,000. In comparison, the Arbitration Board at the GPTO 
received 95 requests in 2000, 81 requests in 2001, and 87 requests in 2002 (GPTO 2003). 
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• Does the German Employees’ Inventions Act create substantial rewards? 
• Which type of inventor profits the most from the German Employees’ 
Inventions Act? 
• How does compensation differ across industries, technical fields, etc.? 
• Do inventors consider the law important in providing suitable incentives? 
• Do inventors point to significant disincentives created by the law? 
 
To answer these questions, we collected data on inventor compensation (measured as the 
share of gross salaries before bonus payments) associated with a particular patent, 
characteristics of the patent and of the associated invention process as well as information on 
inventor biographies. 
Given that the German Employees’ Inventions Act regulates compensation relatively precise, 
our hypotheses for the empirical tests are easily derived: 
H1.  Inventor compensation increases with the value of the patent right. 
H2.  Inventor compensation decreases with the number of co-inventors. 
H3.  Inventor compensation decreases with the inventor’s rank in the organization. 
H4.  Measured as a share of gross salaries, inventor compensation does not vary 
across industries. 
H5.  Measured as a share of gross salaries, inventor compensation does not vary with 
firm size. 
 
The first three hypotheses reflect largely the regulatory components of the German 
Employees’ Inventions Act. The latter two state that inventor compensation follows typical 
patterns of industry and firm size. A large number of studies have documented wage 
differentials between industries and between firms of different size. We measure inventor 
compensation as the share of gross salaries without inventor-specific remuneration; in our 
regressions industry and firm size variables should therefore have no statistically discernable 
effect if inventor compensation is proportional to gross wages.15  
 
4 Data Source and Sample 
4.1 Data Source – the German Inventor Survey 
Data underlying this survey was collected within the scope of a European project sponsored 
by the European Commission. The project named PatVal (The Value of European Patents: 
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 Strictly speaking, the GEIA even allows us to be quite specific about the functional form of our regressions. 
The compensation is proportional to patent value, to the inventor’s share in the invention, and to another factor 
measuring the inventor’s contribution to the service invention. The latter depends on the economic 
exploitability of the service invention, the duties and position of the employee in the company, and also on the 
degree of involvement of the company in the creation of the service invention. 
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Empirical Models and Policy Implications Based on a Survey of European Inventors) started 
in January 2002. The main objective of the PatVal project is to create a database of 
characteristics of the invention process. The data were obtained from a survey of European 
inventors which were named in EPO patent grants. The survey responses were combined with  
information drawn from the patent documents and an extended patent database.  
Research groups from six European universities collaborated on this project. In each of the six 
countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) domestic 
inventors were asked simultaneously about their granted EP patents as well as the invention 
process leading to the specific patent. A detailed description of the research design and of 
descriptive statistics is presented in Giuri et al. (2005). 
This survey only relies on the German dataset of the PatVal survey. Therefore, units of 
observation are inventors who lived in Germany at the time of application of the respective 
patent. 10,500 EP patents containing inventors living in Germany were chosen by a stratified 
random sample from a list of all granted EP patents with priority date between 1993 and 1997 
(15,595 EP patents). A stratified random sample was used in order to oversample potentially 
important patents. To do this, the sample contains all patents an opposition had been filed 
against by a third party (1,048) as well as patents which were not opposed but received at 
least one citation (5,333). Out of the remaining patents (9,212) a random sample of 4,119 
patents was drawn. Within this sample, 118 inventors moved to another country in the 
meantime, and 857 are multiple inventors, which means they filled out at least two 
questionnaires. The remaining 8,357 inventors live in Germany and are represented with one 
patented invention in the dataset.  
The questionnaire was mailed to the identified inventors. As addressee we chose the first 
inventor listed on the patent document. In cases where a verification of the inventor’s address 
had not been possible the second inventor was chosen. If the address of the next inventor 
could not be verified, we proceeded until an address definitely turned out to be correct or a 
new address could be assigned to the inventor. In cases where the invention had been made by 
a single inventor or verification of the addresses had not been possible, we chose the first 
inventor (the only inventor) mentioned on the patent document. The selected inventors were 
provided with a cover letter together with the questionnaire. The letter also contained a link 
leading to a web questionnaire in order to give the inventors the possibility to choose between 
the paper-based and the web-based questionnaire. To date, we received 3,346 responses, 
resulting in a response rate of 32%.16 
The questionnaire is divided into six sections: Section A contains personal information about 
the inventors, section B contains information on their educational backgrounds. Section C 
covers data on employment and mobility of the inventors. Section D is about the invention 
process (collaborations, important sources of knowledge). Section E contains information on 
                                                 
16
 We tested whether inventors who answered the questionnaire early differed significantly from inventors who 
answered late. The first 10% of respondents were considered early respondents whereas the last 10% were the 
late respondents in this analysis. Each of the two groups contained about 300 inventors. The most important 
dependent and explanatory variables were tested for differences: the value of the surveyed patent, the value of 
the patent family as well as the strategic value of the patent, additionally, the compensation for the surveyed 
patent and the compensation for all patents as share of annual income, finally, the inventor’s age as well as the 
number of employees of the applicant. Results show no significant differences (at the 10% level) between the 
two groups. 
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the inventors’ rewards as well as the German Employees’ Inventions Act. This section will be 
most important for the following analysis. Section F finally deals with the value of the 
patents. 
We merged the data from the questionnaire with bibliographic and procedural information on 
the respective patents obtained from the online epoline-database provided by the EPO. The 
epoline-database contains information on all published EP patent applications as well as on all 
published PCT applications since the foundation of the EPO in 1978. The dataset is an 
equivalent of the epoline-data as of March 31st, 2003 and covers over 1,200,000 patent files 
with application dates ranging from June 1st, 1978 to July 25th, 2002. 
 
4.2 Variables 
From the datasets described above, we generated a number of variables which are used in our 
empirical analysis. We briefly describe them here. 
• PATSHARE - share of salary received as inventor compensation for the surveyed 
patent. In the survey, we asked the respondents, which share of their fixed salary they 
had received for the patent in question. We employ an Ordered Probit estimator to 
relate this variable to the exogenous regressors described below. 
• EDUCATION – the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate their terminal degree. 
In order to simplify the analysis, we aggregate our education variables to three groups: 
secondary school or vocational training, vocational academy or university studies, 
doctoral or postdoctoral studies. 
• AGE – the age of the inventor at the time of the survey.  
• INVPROD – inventor productivity adjusted for age. We divide the total number of 
patent applications and inventions kept secret by age minus 25. One way of justifying 
this measure would be the assumption that inventors became active at the age of 25 
and continued to work with constant productivity. Obviously, this is a stark 
simplification, but it will serve to generate a first version of an age-corrected 
productivity figure. 
• MAINFIELD – main technical field. This variable aggregates the technical fields to 
which the inventions belong to.  
• FIRMSIZE – number of employees. We obtained the firm size variable from the 
questionnaire. We use log(number of employees) in our regressions. 
• INVENTORS – the number of inventors. The amount of inventor compensation 
received by any of the inventors depends on the total number of inventors. Since we 
do not have exact information on the contributions made by the inventors, we use this 
variable to control for differences between inventions coming from teams of 
differential size. 
• PATVALUE – the monetary value of the patent. A central question in our survey 
asked respondents to indicate the value interval for their patent. The intervals were 
less than 30,000 €, between 30,000 € and 100,000 €, between 100,000 € and 
300,000 €, between 300,000 € and 1 million €, between 1 and 3 million €, between 3 
and 10 million €, and above 10 million €. We generate a set of 7 dummy variables 
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from this group and include them (with the exception of the first) in the regressions. 
• STRATVALUE – strategic value of the patent. This variable indicates if the patent 
belongs to (a) the top decile of patents in this industry, (b) the top quartile, but not the 
top decile, (c) the top fifty percent but not the top quartile, and (d) the lower half of the 
patents in the industry. We maintain three of the four dummy variables in the 
regressions. Since these are likely to be collinear with the PATVALUE dummies, we 
use these measures as alternatives, not in conjunction. 
• ORIGINALITY and GENERALITY. These measures were first proposed and 
computed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997) for US patents. 
• PCT – a dummy variable indicating that a PCT application had been filed for this 
patent. 
• CITES – citations received within 5 years following the publication of the search 
report. These measures were obtained from a citation database maintained at the 
Institute for Innovation Research. 
• FAMSIZE – size of patent family. We measure the size of the overall international 
patent family by computing the number of equivalent patents in existence. This 
number is obtained from the ESPACE server maintained by the European Patent 
Office. 
• MOBILITY variables – in order to test if mobile inventors (and patents based on 
inventions made by mobile inventors) differ from suitable control groups. We use 
dummy variables indicating that the inventor either (a) did not change to another 
employer after having made the invention (reference group) or (b) changed employers 
once or (c) changed employers twice or (d) changed employers more than twice since 
the date of the invention. 
• CITY variables – two dummies indicating if the invention has been made in a city 
with more than 1 million inhabitants or in a city with between 500,000 and 1 million 
inhabitants. The reference group are inventions made in rural areas or cities with fewer 
than 500,000 inhabitants. 
• INVENTION CONTEXT variables – these variables reflect characteristics of the 
invention process, in particular, (a) if the invention came about as the planned result of 
an R&D project, (b) whether it was an expected by-product of such an R&D process, 
(c) whether it was an unexpected by-product, or (d) whether the invention was made 
during the leisure time of the inventor. The reference group is given by inventions that 
were the product of a non-R&D process, for instance, inventions made in production 
or other functions of the firm. 
 
5 Survey Evidence - Descriptive Statistics 
The sample used for the multivariate analysis contains data from questionnaires received from 
1,983 inventors. These are considerably fewer observations than in the overall sample – the 
reduction is due to the fact that some inventors were independent inventors (266 cases) and 
that some variables we need for the analysis are missing (1,097 cases). Table 1 presents 
summary statistics, i.e. mean values and standard errors for the variables described before. 
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The compensation for the surveyed patent (as share of annual gross income) ranges from 0 to 
100 at an average of 1.8. 100% means that inventors double their annual income due to 
inventors’ compensation. Payment for all patents of the surveyed inventors ranges from 0 to 
500 at an average of 8.3. Over all, 18 inventors receive more than their annual income due to 
compensation for all of their patents. The distributions of these variables are depicted in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. It is clear from these graphs that inventor compensation has a right-
skew distribution – most inventors receive no or very small compensations for their 
inventions, while few inventors can add substantial sums to their gross salary. The inventors 
are characterized by a high educational level. On average, 50% of the inventors in the sample 
earned a university degree; another 38% undertook doctoral or postdoctoral studies. At the 
time of the survey, the inventors were aged between 32 and 76 at an average of 53 years. The 
inventors’ productivity ranges from 0.1 to 32.3 patents per year of inventive activity, with a 
mean of 1.0. This result confirms previous findings by Lotka (1926), who found that the 
productivity of inventors follows a highly skew distribution. 
Almost 60% of all patents were assigned to the chemical/pharmaceutical industry and to 
mechanical engineering. On average, patents were held by companies employing 52,278 
employees. The number of employees ranges between 1 and 500,000 with a standard 
deviation amounting to 97,340. The median of the monetary patent value, ranging from 
“< 30,000 Euro” to “more than 10 million Euro”, falls in the third category “100,000 to 
300,000 Euro”. The strategic patent value has its mean at “the patent belongs to the top 50% 
but not top 25% of the patents within the technological field”. The number of citations 
received within 5 years after publication of the search report ranges from 0 to 13 at an average 
of 0.5 citations. 
Tables 2 to 5 summarize the univariate or bivariate relations between the share of 
compensation received for the surveyed patent and a number of exogenous variables, i.e., 
inventors’ age and education, firm size and number of inventors, monetary patent value, and 
strategic patent value. Table 6 tabulates the average values of a number of variables by 
technical field. 
As to inventor age and education, Table 2 suggests that there are almost monotonic 
relationships between these variables and inventor compensation for the surveyed patent.17 
With greater educational attainment, the compensation share is decreasing. Presumably, this 
reflects the impact of the rank of the individual within the corporation (H3). As age increases, 
inventors tend to earn a higher share as compensation for the surveyed patent. This may very 
well reflect selection processes – productive inventors are retained in R&D, so that over time, 
a positive correlation between value of a patent and inventor age emerges. Note that the effect 
must be strong, since it even compensates the base effect in our dependent variable. As 
inventors get older, their base salary is presumably increasing due to seniority effects. If this 
presumption is correct, the inclusion of patent value in our multivariate regressions should 
render the age variable insignificant. In our value regression, the age variable should have a 
large positive coefficient. As we will see later, both predictions are actually born out. 
A typical finding in labor economics suggests that wages in large firms are higher than those 
in smaller firms. Since we cannot control for the level of gross wages, there is some 
                                                 
17
 Similar results emerge for the overall compensation (inventor compensation for all inventions divided by the 
gross salary before compensation payments). 
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ambiguity associated with the tabulation of the compensation share variable. If the 
compensation share is also a positive function of firm size, we would expect the compensation 
variable to rise or be constant as firm size increases. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 do 
not confirm that view. At best, we find an inversely U-shaped relationship. It seems clear that 
the compensation shares in larger firms are smaller. However, note that this may reflect 
differences in the organization of R&D – inventor teams in large firms may very well have 
more members, thus reducing each inventor’s share. In the multivariate regression, we will 
control for such effects. Should firm size not have a statistically significant impact, then we 
would conclude that inventor compensation (in absolute terms) is depending on firm size just 
as gross wages are. The relationship between compensation and the number of inventors is 
more straightforward – as the invention team gets larger, the average compensation share for 
each inventor is reduced. 
Table 4 displays the relationship between the monetary value of the patent (as indicated by the 
inventor) and the inventor’s compensation (again for the patent under consideration). The 
compensation share is (almost) monotonically increasing with patent value. Similarly, in 
Table 5 we can see clear evidence that the other “relevance variable” – the strategic and 
economic importance of the patent – has a plausible and statistically significant association 
with inventor compensation. This finding is again in accordance with the Guidelines for 
Remuneration as well as § 9 (2) ArbNErfG, determining that the economic exploitability of an 
invention determines the amount of payment. Note that the first group of patents – those 
ranked among the top 10 percent in strategic and economic importance – account for 16.8% 
percent of the observations. That simply reflects the fact that our stratified sampling approach 
has led to an oversampling of valuable and strategically important patents. 
Table 6 summarizes mean values of a number of regressors by technical field. A brief 
inspection of this table shows that the compensation share is strongly affected by the number 
of inventors. While patents in chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the most highly cited and 
account for the largest patent families, the average number of inventors per patent is also 
relatively large. The average compensation share per patent in chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
is therefore the lowest of all technical fields. Nonetheless, the table also yields the puzzling 
result that overall compensation shares are the highest in the technical field of consumer 
goods and civil engineering. This table suggests that there are significant differences in 
inventor compensation across technical fields. But again, since various variables may have 
countervailing effects, the technical field impact needs to be considered in the multivariate 
setting. Before we turn to our multivariate results, we briefly comment on our qualitative 
survey responses. 
To learn more about the motivating or discouraging effect of the German Employees’ 
Inventions Act, the inventors were asked to give their opinion concerning the underlying 
legal regulations. The answers were divided into three groups according to their attitude 
towards legal regulations. Figure 3 shows that 59.5% of the inventors believe the Employees’ 
Invention Act to be largely motivating, whereas 28.3% assume a negative effect on their 
motivation. The remainder, a group of 12.2% of the surveyed inventors, do not attach much 
importance to the legal regulations concerning their inventive performance. 
The first group contains 920 inventors, assigning an overall positive effect to the legal 
regulations. Figure 4 shows frequencies of the incentive drivers mentioned by the inventors in 
the first group. Financial incentives turn out to be second to none, mentioned by 57.2% of the 
sub-sample. The advantage of well-defined legal provisions (18.0%) and the acknow-
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ledgement of inventive performance (16.6%) range far behind, in the second and third place. 
Also important for the employee-inventors is the employer’s support concerning formalities 
of the patent application (3.6%) as well as the absorption of costs and risks by the employer 
(9.3%). 
Inventors who regard the German legislation concerning employee inventions as 
discouraging for the invention process represent the second sub-sample (n2 = 437). Figure 5 
displays that “compensation too small” is the most frequently mentioned disincentive 
(33.6%). One third of the inventors in the second sub-sample consider compensation as too 
low, compared to their inventive performance. Almost one third (32.0%) complain about the 
lack of transparency concerning the determination of an appropriate compensation and about 
the intense influence capability of the employer on its calculation. 15.3% of the respondents 
mention delays in the  payment of compensation (or even no payment) as non-satisfying. 
Due to a decision of the Federal Court of Justice in November 198918, tax benefits for 
employee-inventor compensations have been cancelled. Therefore, it is not surprising that 6% 
of the second sub-sample complain about tax regulations. 9% complain about the additional 
burden of administration necessitated. Also mentioned by the inventors are conflicts with the 
employer (6%) as well as conflicts between inventors among themselves (6%). The particular 
problem concerning inventor - employer-conflicts is that inventors do not want to jeopardize 
their careers by contesting their inventor awards in court or by otherwise turning against their 
employers. Inventors come into conflicts with colleagues due to enviousness, resulting in an 
impairment of team work as well as in an interference of communication between colleagues. 
Results even show that inventors hinder a sequential or substitutional invention not deriving 
from them, in order not to loose the compensation granted for their earlier invention (2%). 
Finally, the inventors reported a phenomenon, already observed by Staudt et al. (1992): the 
co-inventorship of superiors (1.8%). Superiors are mentioned as a co-inventor, not due to 
their inventive performance or participation in the inventive process, but due to their position 
within the firm. Given the notoriety that this phenomenon has received in the literature, our 
results suggest that its importance may have been overstated considerably. 
 
6 Multivariate Analysis 
Our multivariate analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we try to determine how our variables 
are related to the (presumably) most important determinant of inventor compensation – the 
patent’s value. We use the ordinal information from our survey (see Table 4) and employ an 
ordered probit framework for the analysis. Our second step – the analysis of the compensation 
share variable – also treats the data as ordinal. We observe considerable bunching around 
particular integer values (0, 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, ...) in our data so that a transformation to an 
ordinal scale appears appropriate.19 
The first part of the analysis confirms earlier results which suggest that the value of patents is 
highly correlated with a number of indicator variables. We consider the results in column (3) 
                                                 
18
 Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Beschluss vom 29.11.1989 (1 BvR 1402/87, 1 BvR 1528/87) BStBl. 1990 II p. 
479. 
19
 However, it turns out that results from a Tobit-type analysis with a metric dependent variable are quite similar 
to the ones described here. 
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for the overall value specification first. Citations, legal challenges (opposition) and the size of 
the patent family are (as expected) positively associated with patent value. Somewhat 
unexpectedly, two other R&D process variables turn out to have a significant impact. First, 
patented inventions that are the planned product of R&D projects are more valuable than 
unplanned results or mere by-products of R&D. This result may reflect a selection effect – 
firms will actively try to develop ideas in R&D projects, if they expect the project to yield 
valuable results. This interpretation is strengthened by another result – the more inventors are 
involved in the invention, the more valuable it tends to be. Again, choosing relatively large 
teams is likely to reflect a company’s assessment that it should try to achieve the invention 
quickly – presumably, because it is a valuable invention. 
The surprise lies in the second R&D process variable with a positive coefficient – inventions 
made during the inventor’s leisure time are considerably more valuable than other types of 
inventions. This result may reflect two very different phenomena – first, taking the positive 
coefficient at face value, it may indeed be the case that leisure time provides the optimal 
environment for creative break-throughs. On the other hand, the result may involve strategic 
behavior on the part of inventors who wish to enhance their contribution to the inventive 
process. Social desirability may play a big role in generating this result, and we will 
investigate it in more detail in the future. 
A final comment on the value regression concerns the technical field dummy variables. In 
column (3), they do not contribute jointly any more to the explanation of patent value. This 
appears to be due to the inclusion of the R&D context variables in column (3). 
We now turn to the inventor compensation regressions in columns (4), (5) and (6). Our 
expectation is that the results should reflect strongly the legal provisions of the German 
Employees’ Inventions Act. Indeed, in all specifications, the dominant determinant of 
compensation is the patent’s value. The coefficients of the dummy variables are increasing as 
the value of the patent increases, and they are highly significant throughout. Moreover, the 
results are very stable as we include more variables. 
The number of inventors has the expected negative coefficient which is again highly 
significant in all specifications. Interestingly, inventor productivity and educational attainment 
carry a negative sign. This result is consistent with the view that these variables proxy for the 
inventor’s rank in the organization which should be negatively associated with the level of 
compensation for service inventions. 
Firm size and the technical field to which the invention belongs have no impact whatsoever. 
Moreover, the value correlates opposition, citations and family size do not have any impact, 
nor do any of the other variables in that group. Apparently, the inclusion of the value dummy 
variables leaves little explanatory power for these variables. Similarly, the variables 
describing the context of the invention have no explanatory power. 
The remarkable picture emerging from the compensation regression is that those variables 
which should have an impact due to the text of the law do indeed have an impact. While that 
was expected, it seems remarkable that technical field and other variables cannot develop any 
additional explanatory power. It seems that on average, the GEIA is indeed applied fairly 
consistently across different industries and technical fields. This statement leaves considerable 
room for deviations from the average, but it is highly unusual that a set of control variables 
such as those for the technical field of the invention does not have any statistical role in the 
regression. 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper has discussed in some detail differences in national legal provisions dealing with 
the compensation that inventors are entitled to for their service inventions. Germany assumes 
an unusual role in this comparison, since inventor compensation is regulated to a level of 
detail that is not found in other countries. The extent of compensation can be considerable. In 
our sample, the inventors report that they receive on average about 8 percent of their gross 
salaries as compensation for service inventions. Our multivariate analysis yields the surprising 
result that the law appears to be applied very consistently across different technical fields. We 
find that the patent’s value, the number of inventors and variables associated with the 
inventor’s position in the company have the expected impact. Moreover, by comparing these 
results to those of a value regression, we can assure ourselves that the lack of explanatory 
power of other variables is not due to measurement problems. Taken together, there is reason 
to believe that inventor compensation is largely a meritocratic system. 
The qualitative results from our survey confirm that view to some degree. The majority of 
inventors views the compensation system positively. Yet, there appear to be areas in which an 
improvement or reform is necessary. We will consider these areas in more detail in 
subsequent research. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  (N = 1,983) 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Share of salary received as inventor compensation for 
the surveyed patent 
1.76 5.26 0 100 
Share of salary received as inventor compensation for 
all patents1 
7.94 25.70 0 500 
Education (terminal degree) 
Lower secondary school 0.01  0 1 
Upper secondary school 0.01  0 1 
Vocational training 0.06  0 1 
Trade and technical school 0.03  0 1 
University studies 0.50  0 1 
Vocational academy 0.02  0 1 
Doctoral/postdoctoral studies 0.38  0 1 
Age of the inventor at the time of the survey 52.90 9.32 32 76 
Inventor productivity 1.02 1.61 0.1 32.26 
Main technical field 
Electricity/electronics 0.15  0 1 
Instruments 0.09  0 1 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 0.27  0 1 
Process engineering 0.19  0 1 
Mechanical engineering 0.24  0 1 
Consumer goods/civil engineering 0.07  0 1 
Number of employees 52.28 97.34 1 550,000 
Number of inventors 2.49 1.65 1 15 
Monetary value of the patent 32  1 10 
Strategic value of the patent 32  1 4 
Originality 0.04 0.14 0 0.67 
Generality 0.01 0.07 0 0.63 
Oppositions received 0.11  0 1 
PCT application filed 0.27  0 1 
Citations received within 5 years 0.54 1.14 0 13 
Size of patent family 5.40 3.96 1 33 
Job mobility 
Inventor did not change the employer 0.83  0 1 
Inventor changed employer once 0.11  0 1 
Inventor changed employer twice 0.04  0 1 
Inventor changed employer three times 0.01  0 1 
Inventor changed employer more than three times 0.00  0 1 
Environment of the invention 
More than 1 million inhabitants 0.10  0 1 
500,000 to 1 million inhabitants 0.12  0 1 
Less than 500,000 inhabitants 0.78  0 1 
Invention process     
R&D project / planned result 0.29  0 1 
R&D project / expected by-product 0.18  0 1 
R&D project / unexpected by-product 0.18  0 1 
Invention arose during normal job / not R&D 0.29  0 1 
Invention arose during leisure time 0.05  0 1 
 
1:  Multiple inventors are included once (N = 1,800) 
2:   Median 
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Table 2 
Inventor Compensation by Age and Education  
 
 
Age (groups) Educational achievement (groups) 
 Secondary school/ 
vocational training 
Vocational academy/ 
university studies 
Doctoral/postdoctoral 
studies 
Total 
31 to 40 1.25 
(14) 
1.46 
(103) 
0.70 
(39) 
1.25 
(156) 
41 to 50 2.56 
(54) 
1.68 
(380) 
1.44 
(341) 
1.63 
(775) 
51 to 60 2.70 
(79) 
1.81 
(263) 
1.46 
(202) 
1.81 
(544) 
61 to 70 5.32 
(64) 
1.80 
(282) 
1.23 
(162) 
2.06 
(508) 
Total 3.36 
(211) 
1.72 
(1,028) 
1.36 
(744) 
1.76 
(1,983) 
     
 
Note:   In a bivariate ANOVA, the effect of education is highly significant (F = 11.68, p = 0.000), whereas age 
effects are not significant (F = 0.93, p = 0.423) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Inventor Compensation by Firm Size and Number of Inventors  
 
 
Firm size in number 
of employees 
(groups) 
Number of inventors (groups) 
 1 2 3 4 and more Total 
less than 250 2.44 
(97) 
2.56 
(54) 
0.82 
(30) 
0.91 
(21) 
2.07 
(202) 
251 to 1,500 2.70 
(180) 
2.33 
(118) 
1.38 
(61) 
1.42 
(55) 
2.23 
(414) 
1,501 to 10,000 2.24 
(183) 
1.45 
(143) 
1.44 
(99) 
2.36 
(99) 
1.90 
(524) 
more than 10,000 1.75 
(227) 
1.46 
(202) 
1.46 
(161) 
0.91 
(253) 
1.37 
(843) 
Total 2.23 
(687) 
1.77 
(517) 
1.39 
(351) 
1.31 
(428) 
1.76 
(1,983) 
      
 
Note:   In a bivariate ANOVA, the effect of the size of inventor teams is significant at the 10% level (F = 2.42, p 
= 0.064), whereas firm size effects are not significant (F = 1.97, p = 0.116) 
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Table 4 
Inventor Compensation by Monetary Patent Value 
 
 
Patent value  Compensation for this patent  
(share of gross annual income) 
 Number of 
observations 
Share of Obs. Mean 
less than 30,000 € 190 9.6% 0.71 
30,000 to 100,000 € 381 19.2% 1.24 
100,000 to 300,000 € 449 22.6% 1.71 
300,000 to 1 million € 433 21.8% 1.63 
1 to 3 million € 263 13.3% 2.05 
3 to 10 million € 162 8.2% 2.80 
more than 10 million € 105 5.3% 3.97 
Total 1,983 100.0% 1.76 
    
 
Note:   In a univariate ANOVA, the effect of the monetary patent value is highly significant  
(F = 6.33, p = 0.000).  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Inventor Compensation by Strategic Patent Value 
 
Strategic importance of patent  Compensation for this patent  
(share of gross annual income) 
 Number of 
observations 
Share of Obs. Mean 
top 10 percent 332 16.7% 2.70 
top 25 percent 362 18.3% 2.71 
top 50 percent 452 22.8% 1.72 
lower 50 percent 837 42.2% 1.00 
Total 1,983 100.0% 1.76 
 
Note:   In a univariate ANOVA, the effect of the strategic patent value is highly significant  
(F = 13.64, p = 0.000).  
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Table 6 
Means of Compensation for this Patent, Compensation for all Patents, Number of Inventors, 
Number of Citations Received, and Size of the Patent Family by Main Technological Field (N 
= 1,983) 
 
 
Main technical field Compensation 
for this patent 
Compensation 
for all patents 
No. of 
inventors 
No. of 
citations 
received 
within  5 
years 
Size of 
patent 
family 
Electricity/electronics 1.39 6.48 2.19 0.48 4.42 
Instruments 1.41 6.23 2.01 0.59 4.29 
Chemicals/pharmaceuticals 1.59 6.78 3.29 0.73 7.26 
Process engineering 2.09 9.40 2.37 0.51 5.06 
Mechanical engineering 1.94 9.54 2.23 0.41 4.70 
Consumer goods / civil eng. 2.19 13.58 1.83 0.34 5.01 
Total 1.76 8.31 2.49 0.54 5.40 
 
 
Note:   In a univariate ANOVA, the effect of the main technical field turned out to be highly significant  
(F = 42.03, p = 0.000).  
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Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis of Patent Value and Inventor Compensation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
30,000 - 100,000 Euro 0.4247*** 0.4201*** 0.4332***
(0.1522) (0.1528) (0.1522)
100,000 - 300,000 Euro 0.6332*** 0.6214*** 0.6282***
(0.1488) (0.1487) (0.1485)
300,000 - 1 Mio Euro 0.7554*** 0.7532*** 0.7668***
(0.1465) (0.1466) (0.1465)
1 - 3 Mio Euro 0.8835*** 0.8864*** 0.8995***
(0.1551) (0.1552) (0.1551)
3 - 10 Mio Euro 1.1410*** 1.1350*** 1.1401***
(0.1662) (0.1663) (0.1671)
more than 10 Mio Euro 1.4803*** 1.4957*** 1.4945***
(0.1779) (0.1803) (0.1802)
ln (number of inventors) 0.1222*** 0.0843** 0.0773* -0.2000*** -0.1877*** -0.1971***
(0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0410) (0.0542) (0.0545) (0.0555)
ln (number of employees) -0.0070 -0.0035 -0.0023 -0.0109 -0.0120 -0.0144
(0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0142)
electricity/electronics -0.2562*** -0.1684** -0.1620* -0.0905 -0.1159 -0.1257
(0.0827) (0.0849) (0.0872) (0.1163) (0.1176) (0.1208)
instruments -0.1947** -0.1194 -0.1151 0.0511 0.0303 0.0351
(0.0931) (0.0948) (0.0947) (0.1240) (0.1260) (0.1280)
process engineering -0.1540** -0.0901 -0.0950 0.0284 0.0173 0.0376
(0.0764) (0.0774) (0.0782) (0.1056) (0.1053) (0.1059)
mechanical engineering/machinery -0.1617** -0.0842 -0.0796 0.0597 0.0363 0.0494
(0.0778) (0.0795) (0.0800) (0.0993) (0.0999) (0.1014)
consumer goods/civil engineering -0.2021** -0.1476 -0.1649 0.0669 0.0598 0.0645
(0.1009) (0.1031) (0.1044) (0.1443) (0.1440) (0.1454)
ln (1+inventor productivity) 0.1089** 0.1097** 0.1026* -0.3797*** -0.3759*** -0.3815***
(0.0540) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0802) (0.0804) (0.0805)
vocational academy/university studies 0.0133 0.0086 0.0145 -0.2234** -0.2277** -0.2367**
(0.0735) (0.0742) (0.0745) (0.0994) (0.0999) (0.1006)
doctoral/postdoctoral studies 0.0708 0.0384 0.0344 -0.5049*** -0.4965*** -0.5109***
(0.0844) (0.0847) (0.0857) (0.1187) (0.1192) (0.1211)
ln (age of the inventor) 0.2154 0.2808** 0.2376* 0.1401 0.1288 0.1386
(0.1334) (0.1389) (0.1417) (0.1779) (0.1813) (0.1833)
measure of originality -0.0128 -0.0008 -0.2514 -0.2304
(0.1626) (0.1649) (0.2388) (0.2383)
measure of generality -0.5109 -0.5535 -0.2370 -0.2330
(0.4055) (0.4060) (0.5036) (0.5012)
oppositions received 0.2473*** 0.2448*** -0.0092 -0.0091
(0.0724) (0.0730) (0.1062) (0.1065)
PCT application filed -0.0135 -0.0071 0.0574 0.0634
(0.0584) (0.0589) (0.0779) (0.0781)
cites received within 5 yrs 0.0665*** 0.0669*** 0.0005 0.0014
(0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0294) (0.0295)
size of patent family 0.0346*** 0.0334*** -0.0098 -0.0098
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0094) (0.0094)
changed employer once 0.1018 0.0919 -0.0214 -0.0187
(0.0714) (0.0713) (0.1076) (0.1085)
changed employer twice 0.1951 0.1814 -0.0538 -0.0522
(0.1239) (0.1253) (0.1565) (0.1566)
changed employer more than twice -0.2275 -0.2277 -0.4272 -0.4191
(0.2005) (0.1978) (0.3171) (0.3192)
city with more than 1 mio inhabitants 0.0449 0.0919
(0.0834) (0.1065)
city with 500.000 to 1 mio  inhabitants 0.0076 0.0419
(0.0752) (0.0947)
R&D project, planned result 0.1262** 0.1068
(0.0634) (0.0833)
R&D project, expected by-product 0.0118 -0.0349
(0.0687) (0.0948)
R&D project, unexpected by-product -0.1359* 0.0866
(0.0734) (0.0967)
invention arose during leisure time 0.2773*** -0.0480
(0.1037) (0.1613)
Log Likelihood -3620.573 -3591.251 -3581.022 -1550.377 -1547.776 -1545.692
Pseudo R-squared 0.0068 0.0149 0.0177 0.0580 0.0596 0.0609
Chi-squared (df) 47.75 (11) 100.61 (20) 115.06 (26) 177.40 (17) 184.34 (26) 190.23 (32)
Observations 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
ORDERED PROBIT ON PATENT VALUE ORDERED PROBIT ON INVENTOR COMPENSATION
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Figure 1 
Share of Salary Received as Inventor Compensation for this Patent (N = 1,983) 
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Figure 2 
Share of Salary Received as Inventor Compensation for all Patents (N = 1,8001) 
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Figure 3 
Effect of the German Employees’ Inventions Act on Incentives for Innovation 
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Figure 4 
Incentives Emerging from the German Employees’ Inventive Act 
(Sub-Sample of Inventors who Assign a Positive Effect to Motivation  
due to the Legal Regulations) 
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Figure 5 
Disincentives Emerging from the German Employees’ Inventive Act 
(Sub-Sample of Inventors who Assign a Negative Effect to Motivation  
due to the Legal Regulations) 
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Figure 6 
No effect Emerging from the German Employees’ Inventive Act 
(Sub-Sample of Inventors who Assign a Neutral Effect to Motivation  
due to the Legal Regulations) 
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